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Newsletter is a publication of the
Maryland Health Care Ethics
Committee Network, an initiative
of the University of Maryland
Francis King Carey School of Law’s
Law & Health Care Program. The
Newsletter combines educational
articles with timely information
about bioethics activities. Each issue
includes a feature article, a Calendar
of upcoming events, and a case
presentation and commentary by local
experts in bioethics, law, medicine,
nursing, or related disciplines.
Diane E. Hoffmann, JD, MS
Editor

CPR – WHAT HAS HISTORY TAUGHT US?
Dr. James Jude, a Hopkins-trained thoracic surgeon, died in Florida last July. Jude
was one of a number of physicians in the Baltimore area who helped develop modern
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) techniques in the late 1950s. Back then, sudden
cardiac arrest was often triggered by medical procedures performed on hospitalized
patients, such as anesthesia during surgery. Until that time, the standard method of
resuscitating a patient involved direct cardiac massage—something that typically
required a thoracic surgeon
to cut open the patient’s chest
(Jude, 2003). CPR offered the
opportunity to save many lives.
Before that goal could be fully
realized, widespread education
and training was needed.
The evolution from CPR’s
innovation to its widespread
application offers some lessons
for the challenges encountered
in its current use.
CPR is unique in that it
is administered as a default
procedure unless a medical order is written that it be withheld. This raises the question
of how the decision is—and should be—made to withhold CPR attempts. Dr. Baxter’s
essay and the case study in this issue raise this very question: If a patient’s death is
imminent and the goals of care thus shift toward preserving dignity and comfort,
should CPR even be offered?
For a growing number of individuals, death is preceded by extended stays in
intensive care unit (ICU) settings that obfuscate the line drawn where death is deemed
“imminent.” This is relevant because the imminence of death marks a clear transition
from a clinician’s duty to preserve life (often at the expense of comfort) to a duty
to prioritize comfort and dignity during the dying process. Of course, we should
prioritize a patient’s comfort and dignity throughout the disease trajectory. However,
as unavoidable death draws nearer, maintaining comfort and dignity becomes a central
focus. The burden of a particular life-saving intervention should thus be weighed
against its benefits. When death is truly imminent, CPR provides no benefit to the
patient. Benefit to the bereaved who may view failed CPR as the ultimate evidence
that everything was tried to save their loved one’s life raises the question of whether
it’s appropriate to provide CPR merely for the psychological benefit to survivors—
what some have depicted as a modern “death ritual” (Lantos, 1992; Truog, 2010).
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CPR
Cont. from page 1
Jude and his colleagues
foreshadowed this situation. He and
his collaborator and coauthor James
Elam made it clear that CPR should
only be used with patients who
experience sudden cardiac arrest who
could be successfully defibrillated/
revived. In their 1965 book,
Fundamentals of Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation, Elam and Jude
emphasize that CPR is inappropriate
to use with dying patients. Consider
this exchange between Elam and an
attendee of the ad hoc conference
on cardiopulmonary resuscitation,
convened by the National Research
Council of the National Academy of
Sciences in 1966.
Q: When do you start or decide
not to start CPR?
A. (Elam): “This has been critically
reviewed by the committee ... You
start CPR whenever there is a sudden
cardiac arrest. You do not start it on a
patient with an incurable or intractable
chronic disease. You do not start it
when you are sure that the patient has
been clinically dead for so long that
resuscitation with a viable brain is out
of the question. If you are not sure
about starting, the patient deserves
the benefit of the doubt. If in doubt,
start CPR and then determine the prearrest time and status of the patient
as quickly as possible so that you can
decide whether to continue CPR or to
stop it.” (NRC-NAS, 1966, p. 195)
There are three critical points
here: (1) Whether to attempt CPR
is a medical decision; (2) CPR is
inappropriate when death is expected
and unavoidable; and (3) If valid
ambiguity exists among clinicians
at the bedside, CPR can be started
but should be stopped as soon as it is
deemed inappropriate. The first point
was less controversial in the 1960s,
when physicians routinely made
decisions without much input from
patients and families about which

end-of-life treatments to provide or
withhold. In today’s legalistic and
patient-rights-driven era, clinicians
prefer getting permission to withhold
CPR attempts. However, this implies
that patients or their surrogate
decision-makers have the final say.
This often doesn’t “feel” right when
involving patients who won’t survive
discharge from the ICU—not to the
bereaved who feel implicated in the
decision to “allow” their loved one
to die, nor to clinicians who prefer a
more peaceful send-off for a dying
patient than “ritualized CPR.”
Once again, revisiting CPR’s
origins may provide some guidance.
Several organizations, such as the
American Red Cross and the American
Heart Association, spent concerted,
widespread, long-term efforts at
training first responders to do CPR.
Initially, training was limited to health
care providers, then expanded to
emergency medical technicians, and
later, directed toward lay persons.
Early education and training, such as
the ad hoc CPR conference mentioned
above (NRC-NAS, 1966), went into
fine detail about all aspects of CPR
provision, such as how to outfit
ambulances to allow enough physical
space to properly perform CPR, and
how to address attitudinal barriers.

Consider this exchange between Dr.
Larry Birch and an attendee:
Q: Will considerable psychologic
training be needed? I find that most
nurses who have been trained say
they would not use CPR because it is
a doctor’s job.
A (Birch): “I think nurses who have
been reluctant to use CPR are not
doing so because of a psychological
block. This hesitancy relates to the
question of what is nursing practice
and what is medical practice.” (NRCNAS, 1966, p. 190)
With adequate training, nurses
overcame their resistance to
providing CPR and soon accounted
for the largest group of health care
professionals to perform the technique.
Today, clinicians’ moral distress
related to CPR relates more to whether
or when they can refuse to perform
it. Moral concerns about attempting
CPR on dying patients is sometimes
centered on the unnecessary suffering
this causes the patient. This is not a
compelling logical argument, as it’s
unlikely that a patient undergoing
chest compressions and cardiac

defibrillation is conscious enough
to feel pain and discomfort (future
suffering if they are successfully
revived notwithstanding). More likely,
clinicians at the bedside feel that CPR
attempts are not the appropriate way
to demonstrate care and respect for a
dying or dead person’s body.
Granted, what constitutes
appropriate respect for a dead body
depends on context and culture.
Methods of attempting to revive the
recently deceased have existed for
centuries, and include whipping the
body with stinging nettles, blowing
smoke into an animal bladder and
then into the rectum, hanging the
body upside down, or over a barrel
that is moved back and forth, or over
a trotting horse, and burying a body
up to the chest and splashing water on
the face (National Research Council,
1966). Such indignities were justified
if meaningful life was saved. Thus,
the burden of the indignity needs to
be weighed against its benefit. This
weighing process has become more
complex in today’s healthcare climate.
Concerns of patients, bereaved loved
ones, and clinicians at the bedside

all deserve attention, as well as how
to fairly allocate finite healthcare
resources. Education and training for
when not to attempt CPR, and what
will be done instead, is multi-layered,
complex, and a grand undertaking.
It’s time to delve into the fine details,
as we learned from the CPR pioneers.
Clearly this is still a work in progress.
Anita Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
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ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND THE MARYLAND MOLST FORM:
HOW CAN WE DO BETTER?
The following are two relatively recent
initiatives aimed at improving end-oflife care:
1. Completing an advance
directive that specifies
a person’s end-of-life
preferences in order to guide
future decisions (usually,
when a person can’t make
decisions for himself and
is considered terminal or
irreversibly unconscious); and
2. Having a clinician complete
a Maryland Medical Orders
for Life-Sustaining Treatment

(MOLST) form, which
specifies the patient’s present
resuscitation status and which
life-sustaining treatments he
wants or doesn’t want.
Unfortunately, both documents are
only as good as the conversations
informing how they are completed.
Hospice physician Shahid Aziz
proposes one approach to a betterquality discussion about end-of-life
preferences. Instead of completing
a traditional living will that asks
individuals to select how much
technology they would want
clinicians to use to keep them

alive if in a terminal condition,
persistent vegetative state, or endstage condition, Dr. Aziz instructs
individuals to answer the following
three questions and discuss their
answers with their healthcare provider
and the person who will make medical
decisions for them when they lack
capacity to make their own decisions:
1. What is the minimum level
of mental functioning that
is acceptable to you with
the help of life-prolonging
treatments?
Cont. on page 4
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Advance Directives
Cont. from page 3
2. What is the minimum level
of physical functioning that
is acceptable to you with
the help of life-prolonging
treatments?
3. What life-prolonging
treatments are acceptable
to use (indefinitely, or
for a trial period) or not
acceptable to get you to your
minimum acceptable level of
functioning?
Dr. Aziz recently led a workshop
entitled, “Courageous Conversations
on Death and Dying,” where he
encouraged attendees to dialogue
about how they would answer these
questions. Workshop attendee “Bob”
volunteered for some role play, and
initially ran into a few roadblocks
with how such conversations can go.
When pondering his minimum level of
mental functioning, after a long pause,
he replied, “I’d want to be happy.”
Of course, happiness is subjective,
and it’s likely that clinicians around
Bob’s bedside would have different
impressions of whether they could

restore him to a baseline state of
happiness. With some additional
probing, it became clear that Bob
valued being able to meaningfully
communicate with others. Dr. Aziz
suggests that instead of telling
clinicians what treatments you
want or don’t want (unless there are
absolute restrictions such as religious
prohibitions on blood product use),
you should let them use whatever
tools available in their medical toolkit
and scope of practice to get you to
your minimum acceptable level of
functioning. They would then write
MOLST orders based on a better
understanding of your goals of care.
Of course, the challenge in such an
exercise is that it’s difficult to imagine
all possible scenarios and to accurately
predict how your future self will judge
what makes life meaningful. Perhaps it
would be more useful to communicate
where you fall on a continuum of
“wanting everything” the ICU has to
offer (let’s call that person a “vitalist”)
versus “wanting nothing” done to
prolong life (let’s call that person a

“non-interventionist”). Relying on
a traditional living will to inform
which treatments to use, withhold,
or withdraw at the end of life may be
more useful for those who fall on the
extremes of the continuum; less so for
the vast majority in the middle—i.e.,
those willing to try life-prolonging
interventions and stop them if they
don’t achieve their intended goal (let’s
call them “pragmatists”).
Could using Dr. Aziz’s three
questions and knowledge of where
a person falls on the continuum be a
useful replacement or complement
to traditional living will forms?
Perhaps. Again, the usefulness of
this approach rests on the quality of
the conversation that elucidates a
person’s end-of-life preferences, the
ability to effectively communicate
those expressed preferences (i.e., in
written wishes through a living will, or
to an informed appointed health care
agent), and the success in translating
those wishes into appropriate orders
on a MOLST form. Table 1 lists
suggested duties the clinician has

Table 1. Continuum of End-of-Life Preferences and Ensuing Clinician Duties

CLINICIAN DUTIES

VITALIST
“Do everything possible to
keep me alive”

PRAGMATIST
“Try your best to achieve
[goal] in [time or burden
estimate], and if it doesn’t
work, stop”

Clarify understanding of
exceptions (e.g., brain
death, medically ineffective
interventions)

Discuss “three questions”
– focus on minimum
acceptable levels of physical
and mental functioning

NONINTERVENTIONIST
“Never put me on machines!
Ever!”

Clarify whether any exceptions are allowed (e.g.,
anaphylaxis, choking);
persuade to consider less
extreme position (e.g., allow
short trials)
Get consensus on standard of care and invest time to get treatment team and supportive
staff on same page, acknowledge “reasonable degree” part of medical certainty, have
treatment team communicate with one voice, don’t offer false choices, make clear medical
recommendations and communicate them directly and compassionately, ensure buy-in via
fair practices (i.e., treat like cases alike at systems level), educate patients and surrogates
about the moral justification for withdrawing life support to allow natural death, provide
exceptional end-of-life care regardless of patient’s code status.
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Table 2. Duties of patients, surrogates, and clinicians in end-of-life planning and care
•

PATIENT
Choose someone you trust to
speak for you when you can’t

•

•

Appoint that person as your health
care agent (HCA)
•

•

Discuss your preferences with
your appointed HCA

•

Document your preferences (either
in a standard living will or written
letter)

•

•

Have your documented end-of-life •
preferences available when needed

•

Discuss your preferences with
your health care provider (give
him/her a copy of what you wrote
down)

when conversing with individuals
falling on different places along the
end-of-life intervention preferences
continuum. Most individuals need
to be educated about what realistic
options are available, and may need to
be persuaded to consider alternative
perspectives. For example, given the
complexity in determining when death
is imminent and the value that comes
with limited trials of therapy, a great
advance in end-of-life care may come
with more widespread acceptance
of limited trials of life support
technology that is then stopped if it
doesn’t achieve its intended goal.
This is easier said than done. The
“technology-creep” of acute-care life-

SURROGATE
Keep a copy of the patient’s written end-of-life wishes and HCA
appointment

•

Discuss the patient’s preferences
with him/her
Recognize your obligations to
know the patient’s preferences and •
advocate for him/her (not for what
you would want for yourself)
If the patient would agree, consider the value of limited trials of
life-prolonging interventions and
their withdrawal when clinicians
decide they won’t achieve their
intended goal

prolonging interventions often makes
it more difficult for clinicians and
loved ones to accept that the physical
and emotional investment in such
therapies has not paid off. Patients and
their loved ones need to be prepared
in advance for what “stopping”
aggressive life support will look and
feel like, and how the patient and
family will be supported. Palliative
care should be embraced and held up
as a new version of “doing everything”
(rather than the oft-repeated phrase
heard in ICUs of “withdrawing care”
to indicate the switch to comfort care).
Having these courageous
conversations about end-of-life
preferences and documenting them can

•

CLINICIAN
Recognize that facilitating a
“least-bad” death for a patient and
minimizing future regrets/ psychological angst among the bereaved
is a valued public health goal and
laudable goal of medicine
Find ways to enhance your endof-life communication skills (e.g.,
http://depts.washington.edu/
oncotalk/)
Identify standard of care practices,
achieve consensus from your colleagues, and give clear recommendations rather than offering false
choices

take the burden off of individuals (e.g.,
surrogates, clinicians) for making the
final decision to let a patient die. The
focus can then shift away from guilt
or moral distress toward the tasks of
dying and bereavement. Each person
(the patient, the surrogate, the clinician
elucidating end-of-life preferences)
must do his or her own part (see Table
2). To learn more about Dr. Aziz’s
three question approach to end-of-life
conversations, visit his blog, “You
Deserve a Good Death,” at http://
death.blogspot.com/?m=1.
Anita Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator

QUINLAN’S and CRUZAN’S LEGACIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND MARYLAND MOLST
Forty years ago, Karen Ann Quinlan suffered brain damage that caused irreversible unconsciousness. She was kept
alive with ventilator support and medically-provided nutrition and hydration through a gastrostomy tube (“g-tube
feedings”). Her parents won an appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court that allowed Karen’s ventilator support to be
withdrawn, something that was previously considered by many to violate a physician’s professional code of ethics and
possibly to constitute homicide. Karen breathed on her own and lived nine years longer on the g-tube feedings. She
died thirty years ago, from respiratory failure.
Five years later—this year marks the 25th anniversary— Nancy Cruzan died after a long legal battle to allow her
parents to stop her g-tube feedings. She entered into a persistent vegetative state (PVS) seven years earlier, in 1983,
after she suffered severe brain damage in an automobile collision. The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that the state of
cont'd on p. 6
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Missouri could impose a “clear and convincing” standard to determine that an incapacitated person’s g-tube feedings
could be stopped. Subsequent to the Supreme Court case, a lower court in Missouri decided this standard had been
met, resulting in Nancy’s g-tube feedings being withdrawn. She died shortly after, in 1990. This influenced the creation of health care directives (“advance directives”) and the passage of the Patient Self-Determination Act, a federal
law that requires health care institutions to inform adult patients being admitted to their facility (with some exceptions) about advance directives, and to honor a patient’s advance directive.
While a living will is the gold standard for providing “clear and convincing evidence” that life-prolonging measures
such as g-tube feedings, dialysis, or ventilator support should be withheld if one is dying or irreversibly unconscious,
most adults don’t complete one. For those who do, their living will is sometimes ignored, either because a surrogate
demands treatment despite it being precluded in the living will, or the living will isn’t accessible when it’s needed,
or physicians do not consider the patient to be in a “qualifying” condition triggering the living will (e.g., a terminal
condition or death being “imminent”).
Some think the Maryland Medical Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (MOLST) form is a preferable method
of communicating a patient’s end-of-life treatment preferences. MOLST orders are transferable medical orders that
reflect what should be done now if a patient experiences a potentially fatal circulatory or respiratory crisis, while an
advance directive reflects what should be done in the future—usually, when an individual has reached a point where
she/he is less willing to undergo medical procedures that produce discomfort because the resulting life prolongation
would not be worth the burden and discomforts associated with those procedures.
A recent study MHECN undertook this year with funding support from the Maryland Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene explored the use of the MOLST form and advance directives in Maryland healthcare facilities.
Excluding non-psychiatric, non-obstetric, non-trauma admissions, 47.5% of adults had a MOLST form on hospital
admission, and 84% who were discharged from the hospital to a “qualifying” facility (i.e., home health, hospice,
long-term care, a sub-acute facility, or a dialysis center) had a completed MOLST form on record. However, only
30.5% of hospital patients included in the study had an advance directive.
Of note, 68% of patients who died during hospitalization had no documentation in their medical record that they
were in a terminal condition. A qualitative review of the causes of hospital admission for these patients revealed that
many of these deaths would have been expected. This suggests that the most common condition triggering a living
will to be in effect—a terminal condition—is often not recognized by clinicians. The difficulty identifying when a patient is considered “terminal” or “imminently dying” and the low living will completion rate threatens the likelihood
that the MOLST program will achieve its ultimate goal of complementing advance directive use and improving endof-life care in Maryland. However, as Quinlan’s and Cruzan’s legacies demonstrate, attitudes and end-of-life practices
evolve—hopefully for the better.

The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a membership organization, established by
the Law and Health Care Program at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The purpose
of MHECN is to facilitate and enhance ethical reflection in all aspects of decision making in health care settings
by supporting and providing informational and educational resources to ethics committees serving health care
institutions in the state of Maryland. The Network attempts to achieve this goal by:
•

Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate ethical dilemmas within their institution and as
they strive to assist their institution act consistently with its mission statement;

•

Fostering communication and information sharing among Network members;

•

Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other healthcare providers, and members of the
general public on ethical issues in health care; and

•

Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees and ultimately the care of patients in
Maryland.

MHECN appreciates the support of its individual and institutional members. MHECN also welcomes support from
affiliate members who provide additional financial support.
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A PHYSICIAN’S PLEA
Dr. David Baxter is an internal medicine physician who teaches at Memorial University Medical Center and Mercer
Medical School in Savannah, Georgia. He writes here about harms that occur when family members insist that a dying
loved one's death be prolonged in the intensive care unit (ICU) at all costs, and how compassionate health care providers
should respond.
His earthly journey was finally over.
A man imminently and obviously
dying, now finally released from his
captors. He did not clearly express
his will earlier in life, and his family
did not seek his will but their own.
A lone, long distance family member
threatened, cajoled and harassed the
other family members as well as the
clinicians. The clearly appropriate,
medical treatment was comfort care,
but because of one strident voice,
comfort was substituted for the ICU,
ventilators and vasopressors.
The initial stage of his illness
was thought only to be a chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD) exacerbation. Subsequent
respiratory failure led to the revelation
of a previously unknown advanced
lung malignancy. Surgery would
be an immediate sentence of death.
Chemotherapy was demanded and
reluctantly given with no result except
for severe, almost deadly side effects.
All but one family member could see
the situation with emotional clarity.
Ethics meetings and family meetings
followed, but the lone, shrieking voice
of compulsion could not be abated.
Ethical “futility” was proclaimed. The
threat of litigation drove the ICU stay
to continue. The lawyers thought they
had made the decision, but death—
the final arbiter—would eventually
prevail. As professionals we must
remain in our clinical roles, but in
these times of turmoil and conflict, we
are torn by our humanity. As humans
we are aware of our rights but less
so our responsibilities. In our current
health care world, we clinicians are
aware of our responsibility yet sense
a limitation of our rights. Patient
autonomy has become the prime
meridian. This has led to clinicians
being told what to do (most often by

families) when clinical benefit is not
easily documented and often obviously
absent.
Anger and frustration abound
while watching this sight of sadness.
Not being allowed to provide the
appropriate comfort care, but to flog
a fellow human being is morally
repulsive. I don’t care how much you
argue that with good pain control
the patient would not suffer, I don’t
believe you. Intubated and sedated in
the ICU, even with the best care, is not
comfortable. When is “do everything”
going to be accepted to mean
"everything reasonable”? When are we
going to allow physicians to practice
their art and not be held hostage to a
belligerent, berating bully?
Medical therapies are utilized based
on reasonable and likely results.
Risks and benefits are weighed
daily—almost unconsciously— as we
artfully apply science to individual
patients. As medical care is offered,
it is either accepted or refused. Every
day patients refuse medical care we
deem important. This refusal of care
is bothersome, but in a patient of
age and capacity, the patient's will is
allowed to prevail. When the clinicians
know the clear will of the patient a
demand to “do everything” is usually
refined with reasonable goals of care.
Everything possible should be defined
as clinically rational and reasonable.
To amputate a toe for a hang nail
would be clinically wrong and morally
repulsive. To intubate, sedate and
essentially flog a patient dying of
terminal disease near death is also, in
my view, clinically inappropriate and
morally repulsive.
When medical care that is not
clearly indicated is demanded by
family, the physicians should not be
held hostage, particularly by the fear

of litigation. Treatments that are not
medically appropriate are not care but
cruelty. These demands lead to moral
conflict in the treating team.
Examples of patient demands
abound. The relatively common
demand for antibiotics for viral
illnesses driven by physician pacifism
and fear of litigation has led to the
death of many from worsening
antibiotic resistance patterns. As
participant pawns in this drama, the
medical caregivers feel helpless.
Helplessness leads to hopelessness.
Anger and frustration are quickly
birthed.
“We” as health care professionals
never cure the real problem. Death, the
inevitable enemy, is always lurking.
Our earthly technologies and potions
only temporize the pangs of death.
The mysteries of science only prod the
inherent miracles active in the body.
The surgeon cuts and sews, but the
body heals. The internist pokes, prods
and prescribes potions, but the body
has to absorb and process so the true
miracle, life itself, may continue.
Currently the law, which in reality
is designed to prevent harm, not
compel good, allows fellow human
beings to be forced to go beyond
the reasonable, often in the guise of
hoping for a miracle. Often we are told
that a “miracle” of the Lord is what is
expected. In these situations God has
already spoken. We just won’t accept
what He has said.
The true miracle is life itself.
J. David Baxter, MD
Mercer University School of
Medicine
Savannah, GA
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CASE PRESENTATION
One of the regular features of this Newsletter is the presentation of a case considered by an ethics committee and an
analysis of the ethical issues involved. Readers are both encouraged to comment on the case or analysis and to submit
other cases that their ethics committee has dealt with. In all cases, identifying information about patients and others in the
case should only be provided with the permission of the patient. Unless otherwise indicated, our policy is not to identify
the submitter or institution. We may also change facts to protect confidentiality. Cases and comments should be sent to
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or MHECN, Law & Health Care Program, University of Maryland Francis King Carey
School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD 21201.
This case study and the first
commentary are reprinted with
permission from The Journal of
Hospital Ethics, 2014, Volume 3,
Number 3.
CONSULTATION REQUEST
FROM A NICU
Baby CE is an 11-day-old female
who was born at 23 weeks and 5 days
of gestation and is now in multi-organ
failure. She is the surviving neonate of
a twin pregnancy. She was designated
Baby A in utero.
Baby CE’s mother went into labor
at 23 weeks and 5 days. She had a
spontaneous rupture of membranes, at
which time her cerclage was removed
and purulent drainage was noted
coming from the cervical opening. The
twins were then delivered via cesarean
section. Baby B was stillborn. Baby
A, named Baby CE, was successfully
resuscitated and stabilized, weighing a
mere 550 g (1 lb 3 oz).
Baby CE’s prognosis was grim
at birth. She had a critical, though
expected, course for the first 5 days
of life. She required significant
ventilator support and developed
pulmonary interstitial emphysema.
She was hypotensive, which required
pressors for support, and ultimately
received medical treatment for a
patent ductus arteriosus (a congenital
disorder wherein a neonate’s ductus
arteriosus fails to close after birth).
She was hyperglycemic and required
an insulin drip. She was found, by
head ultrasound, to have bilateral
grade 2 intraventricular hemorrhages.
As is typical, she received blood
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transfusions and broad-spectrum
antibiotics.
Day 6, however, was a turning
point in the wrong direction. Baby
CE had a pulmonary hemorrhage
but managed to survive. She was
coded with chest compressions and
epinephrine. She required multiple
blood products in order to be
stabilized. She also required increased
pressor support, and was found to
have several new, extensive bilateral
cerebellar hemorrhages. In addition,
she was found to have a significant
liver hematoma, which may have
been secondary to the known physical
trauma a code can induce.
During the night of her eighth day
of life, Baby CE once again became
severely hypoxic and bradycardic from
a presumed pulmonary hemorrhage.
Over the next several days, Baby CE’s
overall status worsened. The team was
becoming increasingly uncomfortable
continuing to provide life-extending
therapy they felt was not indicated and
would never help Baby CE.
Now, on day 11 of life, the baby’s
course is not going well. The NICU
team, including a neonatologist,
nurse, social worker, and chaplain,
meets with the parents to discuss
their concerns about Baby CE. The
team explains that Baby CE has no
meaningful expectation of survival
and has signs indicating respiratory,
cardiac, liver, and kidney failure at
this time. Additionally, if she were
to survive, she is expected to have
profound neurologic impairment.
Baby CE’s parents are quiet through
much of the meeting, but express

their faith that the NICU team will
do everything they can to save their
baby. The team explains that at this
point they can continue to support
Baby CE with the current management
if that is the family’s desire. They
feel, however, that should she decline
further, cardiac compressions and
epinephrine no longer would be
indicated. The team explains that
cardiac compressions are generally not
useful in the NICU, especially when
the cardiac failure is a result of overall
multi-organ failure. They point out
that cardiac compressions can cause
substantial trauma to infants. Baby
CE’s parents remain quiet, tearful, and
undecided as to whether they believe
compressions ought to be performed
or not.
The NICU team is distraught at the
end of the meeting; the team is uneasy
with the parents’ unwillingness to
accept that resuscitative efforts are
likely not in the baby’s best interests.
The NICU group knows that in some
jurisdictions, including their own, a
patient’s or surrogate’s permission is
not needed for a physician to write
an AND/LT (Allow Natural Death/
Limited Therapy) order. The team
involves other NICU physicians and
senior nurses in a discussion about the
care and ethical dilemmas surrounding
Baby CE. Some members of the team
feel that if cardiac compressions will
not be helpful to the infant, then they
should not be offered or provided.
Other members feel that the parents’
lack of agreement with the NICU
physicians means that the NICU

team should do everything possible,
regardless of the potential harm and
lack of expected benefit to the infant,
to keep this infant alive, at least for
now. Other members still are hopeful
that with some additional time the
parents will be able to accept the
physicians’ recommendation not to
resuscitate. Some members point out
that because many parents feel this
decision is too burdensome — that to
agree not to resuscitate would mean
that they were giving up on their child,
something they could never live with
— the team should not even be asking
the parents anything at this point;
they should simply tell them that
resuscitation would not be attempted
in the face of a cardiac arrest. Having
already lost one of their twins, this
family may simply be unable to say
that it is okay to stop resuscitative
efforts. An ethics consult is requested
to help determine the best course of
action.
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A
NEONATOLOGIST & CLINICAL
ETHICS STAFF
Neonatologist Dr. Courtney De
Jesso and Staff from the Center
for Ethics at MedStar Washington
Hospital Center (WHC) provide here
(reprinted with permission) what an
ethics consultation chart note with
recommendations would look like for
this case.
CHART NOTE AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Ethics consultation requested
by neonatology intensive care unit
(NICU) regarding an 11-day-old
female infant born prematurely at
23 weeks and 5 days gestation and
currently suffering multi-organ system
failure. Ethics holds a discussion
with the infant’s primary physician
and the rest of the NICU team in an
effort to learn the specifics of the
medical circumstances and to gather
a comprehensive picture of the team’s

concerns in relation to the parents’
inability to make a decision. Primary
concerns of the team surround an
ethical justification to act on what they
feel is in the best interest of the infant
in light of the parents’ indecision.
The NICU team wants to explore the
ethics of the possible paternalism
of making the decision about future
resuscitation themselves. Further, the
team is interested in the ramifications
if the parents decide they want full
coding efforts taken and the team
remains opposed. Another concern
is about whether asking them to
essentially “give up” on their infant
places an overwhelming emotional
burden, which they are currently
psychologically unfit to bear —how
would the team know that and if they
could determine that was the case,
what should they do?
Subsequent to the team meeting, a
separate conversation was had with
the parents. The parents were still
visibly distraught, though tranquil,
having come no closer to making
a decision themselves. They did,
however, recognize the gravity of their
infant’s prognosis and were able to
reasonably understand the futility and
further trauma that would likely come
as a result of additional resuscitative
measures. They confessed to an
inability to come to terms emotionally
with making the finite decision to
actually request measures not be taken.
The father’s last statement was, “We
just can’t tell them to stop, but they
should do whatever they think is best.”
Ethics communicates the results of the
meeting to the NICU team.
Ethics recommends that the
physician, with at least 1 or 2 other
members of the NICU team, meet with
the parents to explain that if the baby
codes (unless there is improvement in
the baby from where she is right now),
resuscitation will not be initiated—that
is, if the baby’s heart stops, that will
be the way everyone knows it is time
to stop.

REASONING
This case illustrates an often
occurring and dilemmatic feature in a
clinical ethics consultation involving
parents of a dying infant—that is,
when what is in the best interest of
a patient is reasonably understood
by all, but rendered emotionally
unacceptable by family or loved ones.
Often, some additional time is all
that is needed for family members to
negotiate the psychological resistance
to coming to terms with what they are
able to rationally accept. However,
just as often, family members simply
cannot bear the weight of making such
a decision no matter how long they are
given, or the time to lengthily reflect is
simply not available given the clinical
circumstance.
Sometimes, it may be best that
the medical team refocuses around
the cessation of the demand for a
decision, rather than continuing to
insist. Sometimes the insistence itself
is ethically objectionable. Often, just
taking the proper steps to gain the
parents’ understanding and acceptance
that, without a definitive position from
them, the medical team will do what
they believe is in the patient’s best
interest. Often, the relief associated
with not having to make a decision of
this significance, and thus carry the
moral distress and emotional weight
related to the choice, is often all that
may be unconsciously sought by
parents and/or other family members
suffering through the tremendous
anxiety that comes with such a
responsibility.
Identifying this complex state of
mind in family members is no easy
task. Clinicians ought to be mindful,
however, of communicative signs
that indicate a person’s acceptance
or resignation to the clinical
circumstance. The removal of the
absolute requirement for parents and/
Cont. on page 10
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or other family members to make a
decision may be needed in order to
reduce said anxiety and allow these
individuals the ability to release the
guilt associated with making this
difficult decision.
Courtney E. De Jesso, MD
Neonatal-perinatal Fellow, MedStar
Georgetown University Hospital.
The Editorial Group of the Center
for Ethics at MedStar Washington
Hospital Center
COMMENTS FROM A
NEONATOLOGIST
Sharing treatment options with
families in the neonatal ICU is not a
straightforward task.
How do I know which treatment
decisions to share? Should I offer
choices of antibiotics for urinary
tract infection? Choices of formula?
Choices of pain management for
central line placement? And should
I offer every family those choices?
The 15 year old mother? The nonEnglish speaking parent with a 4th
grade education? How should I
help them make the decision? How
can I be certain that my colleagues
would offer these same choices—and
should we disclose to parents that
we all have different practices in this
regard? Should I formally obtain and
document the parents’ consent for
these treatments—and how detailed
does that consent have to be? If the
family agreed that I should choose
the specific antibiotic, is it valid to
document that “the family agreed with
my choice of amoxicillin?”
These considerations are contrived,
but their essential elements
underlie discussions regarding
cardiopulmonary resuscitation with
families of sick infants in the NICU.
Consistency, fairness, transparency,
and autonomy are core components of
collaborating with families to make
decisions about CPR. Compassion
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and equanimity are just as important:
these decisions require hard work, and
we (both families and clinicians) are
all doing the best we can.
A decision for, or against, neonatal
CPR is usually one element of
a much larger and complicated
narrative. Whereas code status for
adult patients is often discussed
upon routine hospital admission
or during outpatient discussion of
advanced directives, the need to plan
for neonatal CPR is not routine or
hypothetical. Families of these infants
are always in the midst of chaotic and
emotional experiences, and rarely
prioritize factual information—such as
chance of successful CPR—the way
that clinicians do.
As Blinderman et al. (2012)
described, if clinicians present CPR
to families as the default option (“we
will plan to resuscitate unless you
tell us not to”) it may be perceived
as a recommendation. Averting
this scenario requires upstream and
intentional decisions by clinicians
about whether or not CPR is a valid
intervention (Mercurio, et al., 2014).
All too often, clinicians perceive
their duty to be to offer all families
the option of CPR regardless of the
medical scenario. In the case of Baby
CE, once it became clear that the
infant was dying, the clinicians could
have decided to not offer CPR to the
family at all. Instead, the clinicians
told the family that CPR was “not
indicated” and “generally not useful.”
Following Blinderman’s approach,
the clinicians could have more clearly
indicated that CPR does not work for
patients like Baby CE and therefore
would not be used. By not offering it,
the family is relieved of the burden
to decide. If the family had actively
objected to withholding CPR, ethics
consultation would be the next step.
In this case, it appears that the NICU
clinicians considered taking the CPR

decision back from the parents after
offering it, and invited the broader
NICU team to discuss this approach.
Predictably, there was not 100%
agreement among the clinicians about
what should be done. This is nearly
always the case, and can heighten staff
distress because it highlights conflict
within the team. But consensus
decisions do not require 100%
agreement, they require majority
agreement. Protocols for conscientious
objection ought to be discussed with
those clinicians who feel they cannot
participate in the plan of care.
The language of ethical,
professional, and legal guidelines that
help clinicians approach end-of-life
decision-making with families always
includes some measure of ambiguity
(“medically indicated,” “inevitable
demise,” “potentially helpful”). An
understandable motivation to reduce
our decisional burden can lead us to
oversimplify our approach and simply
“offer everything” for every patient.
It is important to recognize when our
decision-making paradigm merely
offsets the burden to families.
Renee D. Boss, M.D., M.H.S.
Associate Professor
Johns Hopkins Division of
Neonatology
Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of
Bioethics
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DECEMBER

CALENDAR OF EVENTS

14 (12N-1:15pm)
JHSPH Centennial Celebration Seminar, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics, Baltimore, MD. For more
information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
JANUARY 2016
11 (12N-1:15pm)
Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: Jeremy Greene, MD, PhD, MA, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics,
Baltimore, MD. For more information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
25 (12N-1:15pm)
Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: Mark Rothstein, JD, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics, Baltimore, MD.
For more information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
FEBRUARY
4 (12N-1:30pm)
Berman Bioethics Brin Lecture: Steven Joffe, MD, MPH, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. For more
information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
8 (12N-1:15pm)
Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: Adnan Hyder, MD, PhD, MPH, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. For
more information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
22 (12N-1:15pm)
Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: Julian Savulescu, PhD, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. For more
information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
MARCH
4-6
Approaching the Sacred: Science, Health and Practices of Care, JW Marriott Galleria, Houston, TX. For more information,
visit www.MedicineandReligion.com.
14 (12N-1:30pm)
Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: Anita Tarzian, PhD, RN, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. For more
information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
17-18
Professional Skills Program in Dispute Resolution, sponsored by The Center for Dispute Resolution at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law and the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution at Pepperdine University School of Law. MD Carey Law,
Baltimore, MD. For more information, visit http://www.law.umaryland.edu/adrskills.
17-18
Are We Hearing Our Patients’ Voices? Healthcare Ethics Consortium Annual Conference. Atlanta Evergreen Marriott Conference Center,
Stone Mountain, GA. For more information, visit http://www.hcecg.org/HEC_Conference_2016.
17-18
Bioethics: Preparing for the Unknown, sponsored by Western Michigan University’s Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Kalamazoo, MI. For more information about the Center, and updates about the conference, please visit www.wmich.edu/ethics.
28 (12N-1:15pm)
Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: John Wilbanks, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. For more information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
APRIL
11 (12N-1:15pm)
Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: Jerry Menikoff, MD, JD, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. For more
information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
15-17
Interfaces and Discourses: A Multidisciplinary Conference on Islamic Theology, Law, and Biomedicine, sponsored by The Initiative on
Islam and Medicine at theUniversity of Chicago, Ida Noyes Hall – Cloister Club, Chicago, IL. For more information,
visit https://pmruchicago.submittable.com/submit.
25 (12N-1:15pm)
Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: Ellen Clayton, MD, JD, MS, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. For
more information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
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